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Abstract
Paul Horwich (1990) once suggested restricting the T-Schema to the
maximal consistent set of its instances. But Vann McGee (1992) proved
that there are multiple incompatible such sets, none of which, given
minimal assumptions, is recursively axiomatizable. The analogous
view for set theory—that Naïve Comprehension should be restricted
according to consistency maxims—has recently been defended by
Laurence Goldstein (2006; 2013). It can be traced back to W.V.O. Quine
(1951), who held that Naïve Comprehension embodies the only really
intuitive conception of set and should be restricted as little as possible.
The view might even have been held by Ernst Zermelo (1908), who,
according to Penelope Maddy (1988), subscribed to a ‘one step back
from disaster’ rule of thumb: if a natural principle leads to contra-
diction, the principle should be weakened just enough to block the
contradiction. We prove a generalization of McGee’s Theorem, and
use it to show that the situation for set theory is the same as that for
∗University of Amsterdam and Institute for Logic, Language and Computation,
L.Incurvati@uva.nl
†University of Kent and Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, Ludwig-
Maximilians Universität, München, j.murzi@gmail.com
1
truth: there are multiple incompatible sets of instances of Naïve Com-
prehension, none of which, given minimal assumptions, is recursively
axiomatizable. This shows that the view adumbrated by Goldstein,
Quine and perhaps Zermelo is untenable.
Naïve set theory is underwritten by the Naïve Comprehension Schema, which
consists of all instances of
(NC) ∃y∀x(x ∈ y↔ Φ(x))
where Φ(x) is any formula in L∈ (the language obtained by adding ‘∈’ to
the language of first-order logic with identity) in which x is free and which
contains no free occurrences of y. The schema is intended to express the
thought that every condition determines a set: the set of all and only those
objects to which the condition applies.
Naïve truth theories adhere to the unrestricted T-Schema:
(T) Tr(pφq)↔ φ
where Tr is a truth-predicate and pφq is, for present purposes, the numerical
code of φ relative to some fixed coding scheme. The principle trades on
the putative fact that φ and “φ’ is true’ have the same content, and hence
should be at least materially equivalent.
Naïveté has a price, however: unless classical logic is quite radically
weakened, paradox looms. Let Φ(x) in (NC) be x 6∈ x, and you get Russell’s
Paradox. Take φ in (T) to be λ = ¬Tr(pλq), and you get the Liar Paradox.
This much is well-known. What is not so well-known is whether (NC) and
(T) can be consistently restricted in a way that is faithful to the spirit of the
naïve conceptions they characterize.
In this note, we examine the view that naïve principles should be re-
stricted according to consistency maxims. A proposal along these lines
was once made by Paul Horwich (1990) for truth, and has recently been
2
defended by Laurence Goldstein (2006; 2013) for both truth and set theory.
For the case of sets, the view goes back at least as far as W.V.O. Quine
(1951). In his view, (NC) embodies the only really intuitive conception of set,
and should, in keeping with the maxim of minimal mutilation, be restricted
as little as possible so as to avoid the paradoxes. He writes:
Only because of Russell’s paradox and the like do we not adhere
to the naïve and unrestricted comprehension schema [. . . ] Hav-
ing to cut back because of the paradoxes, we are well advised to
mutilate no more than what may be fairly responsible for the
paradoxes. (Quine 1951, pp. 50–1)
The view might even have been held at one time by Ernst Zermelo (1908, p.
263–4). According to Penelope Maddy (1988, p. 485), Zermelo saw himself
as giving us as much of (NC) as possible without inconsistency. With
Zermelo, Maddy suggests, it emerged the rule of thumb she labels ‘one
step back from disaster’: if a natural principle leads to contradiction, the
principle should be weakened just enough to block the contradiction.
Strictly speaking, Goldstein also requires acceptable instances of the
naïve schemata not to entail tautologies, as well as contradictions.1 How-
ever, it is easy to see that such a proposal would involve quite a radical
1Tautologies and contradictions, says Goldstein, lack content, and hence ‘fail to state
conditions or to give a recipe for determining whether any given object belongs in the
set’ (Goldstein 2013, p. 35) in the case of sets, and fail to specify coherent truth-conditions
in the case of truth. Thus, ∃y∀x(x ∈ y ↔ x 6∈ x) is not an acceptable instance of (NC),
and Tr(pλq) ↔ λ is not an acceptable instance of (T): both entail a contradiction, and
hence are ‘vacuous’ and specify conditions that are ‘impossible to satisfy’ (Goldstein
2006, p. 886). In Goldstein’s view, this is the reason for thinking that the set-theoretic
and semantic paradoxes belong to the same family: ‘[h]erein lies the similarity between
these two families of paradox. The sets and the statements we thought we were dealing
with are irredeemably ill-defined, and so do no exist’ (Goldstein 2006, p. 887). It is then
only natural, Goldstein suggests, to restrict (NC) and (T) to instances that are neither
vacuous nor impossible to satisfy. The restriction, he adds, is a principled one: it follows
from the Tractarian view that logical truths and falsehoods do not express propositions
(Wittgenstein 1922).
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departure from classical logic.2 We are here interested in the prospects
for curtailing the Naïve Comprehension Schema whilst retaining classical
logic, and focus on the idea that the problematic instances to be banned are
the inconsistent ones—the ones giving rise to paradox.3 We argue that the
prospects for such a strategy are not good: restrictions of the kind Goldstein
advocates fail for essentially the same reasons why, as Vann McGee (1992)
first noticed, Horwich’s proposed restriction of the T-Schema also fails.
1 Consistency
Goldstein writes:
The naive comprehension axiom captures a very clear concep-
tion of sets, and it makes sense to tamper with it as little as
possible, identifying and justifying the restriction that must be
made to its application, rather than building up set theory from
entirely new foundations. (Goldstein 2013, pp. 35–6)
So how can (NC) be made consistent, without tampering too much with the
naïve conception of set?
If classical logic is to be preserved, Goldstein’s idea amounts to restrict-
ing (NC) according to the following injunction:
Consistent. An instance φ of (NC) is admissible just in case φ 6`
⊥.4
2In classical logic, tautologies are entailed by any sentences whatsoever, and hence also
by instances of (NC). Goldstein is, of course, well aware of this, and in fact endorses a
non-classical logic (see Goldstein 2012).
3To be sure, a different strategy for the naïve set theorist would be not to restrict (NC),
and, in order to avoid triviality, weaken the logic instead. See e.g. Grishin 1981, Weber 2010
and Weber 2012. In the remainder of the paper, we focus on classical naïve but consistent
set theory. We briefly return to non-classical naïve set theory in fn. 15 below.
4Here and throughout, ‘`’ stands for first-order deducibility.
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Unfortunately, this restriction will not do. The problem is that it is easy
to exhibit instances of (NC) which are consistent given extremely weak
assumptions—and therefore admissible according to Consistent—but to-
gether lead to inconsistency. We give two examples.
The first example rests on the observation that instances of (NC) can
be obtained by considering formulae Φ(x) containing free variables other
than x, known as parameters. Such instances are assumed to be prefaced by
universal quantifiers binding these free variables. One such instance—in
effect, also an instance of ZFC’s Separation Schema—asserts, for any set,
the existence of the subset of all non-self-membered members of that set.
Trouble arises when we consider this instance in conjunction with one
asserting the existence of a universal set.
Example 1. The following are instances of (NC):
(1) ∃y∀x(x ∈ y↔ x = x)
(2) ∀z∃y∀x(x ∈ y↔ (x ∈ z & x 6∈ x))
(1) has a model consisting of just one object a such that a = {a}.5 (2) is true
in any model consisting of a single hereditarily finite set.6 The simplest
such model is the one consisting of just one object a such that a 6∈ a, that
is the model consisting of just the empty set—the first hereditarily finite
set.7 Hence, (1) and (2) are both admissible according to Consistent. But it is
5Alternatively, if one prefers a model without non-well-founded sets, one can consider
a model which consists of a looped one-node graph, in which variables range over nodes,
and in which x ∈ y just in case there is a directed edge from the node assigned to y to the
node assigned to x.
6A set is said to be hereditarily finite iff it is finite, its members are finite, the members of
its members are finite, and so on. In other words, a set is hereditarily finite iff its transitive
closure is finite.
7In fact, as a referee pointed out, it is clear that (2) holds in any model satisfying
∀x(x 6∈ x). Take any set z in such a model and let y be z itself. Then (2) reduces to
∀x(x ∈ z↔ (x ∈ z & x 6∈ x)). But since ∀x(x 6∈ x) holds in this model, this reduces to the
logical truth ∀x(x ∈ z↔ x ∈ z).
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routine to derive a contradiction from (1) and (2) together.8
In the light of Example 1, one might be tempted to ban instances of (NC)
that are obtained using parameters. Our second example shows that this is
not enough to dispense with the problem. The example makes use of the
following observation, which goes back to George Boolos (1993, p. 233):
Lemma 2. For each φ in L∈,
(i) ` ∃y∀x(x ∈ y↔ (¬φ & x 6∈ x))→ φ
(ii) ∃y∀x(x 6∈ y) ` φ→ ∃y∀x(x ∈ y↔ (¬φ & x 6∈ x))9
Example 3. Take your favourite σ such that both σ and ¬σ are consistent—
for instance, let σ be shorthand for ‘There are at least thirty objects’. Then,
the following are instances of (NC):
(3) ∃y∀x(x ∈ y↔ (¬σ & x 6∈ x))
(4) ∃y∀x(x ∈ y↔ (σ & x 6∈ x))
8(1) immediately entails ∀x(x ∈ a ↔ x = x). Instantiating (2) with a (the universal
set) we have that there is a set of all non-self-membered members of a: ∃y∀x(x ∈ y ↔
(x ∈ a & x 6∈ x)). From this, we get b ∈ b ↔ (b ∈ a & b 6∈ b). But instantiating
∀x(x ∈ a ↔ x = x) with b we also have that b ∈ a ↔ b = b. Therefore, b ∈ b ↔ b 6∈ b.
Contradiction.
9For (i), suppose ∃y∀x(x ∈ y↔ (¬φ & x 6∈ x)). Now suppose towards ∃-elimination
that ∀x(x ∈ a↔ (¬φ & x 6∈ x)). Then we have that a ∈ a↔ (¬φ & a 6∈ a). Now suppose
a ∈ a. Then ¬φ & a 6∈ a and so a 6∈ a. Contradiction. So a 6∈ a. But then suppose ¬φ.
Then a 6∈ a & ¬φ and so a ∈ a. Contradiction again. By classical reductio it follows that
φ. But φ has been obtained on the supposition that ∀x(x ∈ a ↔ (¬φ & x 6∈ x)). Hence,
by ∃-elimination we have φ on the overall supposition that ∃y∀x(x ∈ y↔ (¬φ & x 6∈ x)).
The result follows by conditional proof.
For (ii), first notice that b 6∈ a follows from our premiss ∃y∀x(x 6∈ y) and suppose φ.
Now suppose b ∈ a. This contradicts b 6∈ a, and so we can infer ¬φ & b 6∈ b. Next, suppose
¬φ & b 6∈ b and further assume b 6∈ a for ¬-introduction. Since both φ and ¬φ are among
our assumptions, b ∈ a follows by classical reductio. We have derived ¬φ & b 6∈ b from
b ∈ a and b ∈ a from ¬φ & b 6∈ b. By↔-introduction, it follows that b ∈ a↔ (¬φ & b 6∈ b).
Applying ∀-introduction and ∃-introduction, we obtain ∃y∀x(x ∈ y ↔ (¬φ & x 6∈ x)).
Thus, we have ∃y∀x(x ∈ y↔ (¬φ & x 6∈ x)) on the overall supposition that φ. The result
follows by conditional proof.
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By Lemma 2(ii), any proof of a contradiction from (3) could be transformed,
in the presence of the Empty Set Axiom, into a proof of a contradiction from
σ, and similarly for (4). Hence, in the presence of the Empty Set Axiom, (3)
and (4) are both admissible instances of (NC) according to Consistent. But
by Lemma 2(i), (3) entails σ, and (4) entails ¬σ. Contradiction.
In short: instances of (NC) that are admissible according to Consistent may
be jointly inconsistent, and hence unacceptable.10 This suggests that naïve
but consistent set theorists must focus on acceptable sets of instances of
(NC)—a suggestion to which we now turn.
2 Maximal consistency
The naïve set theorist might take the results of the previous section to
simply show that, whenever the addition of a consistent instance of (NC)
yields an inconsistency, the instance is not acceptable after all. That is,
she might take the naïve principles to be so intuitive that we should keep
as many instances of them as we consistently can. More formally, the
acceptable instances of (NC) must form a maximally consistent set:
10The situation here is analogous to that arising in the context of the debate on the
acceptability of abstraction principles. These are principles of the form
§(α) = §(β)↔ α ≈ β
where § is an operator taking items of type α and β to be objects, and ≈ is an equivalence
relation on items of that type. In Grundlagen (1884), Frege considered and discarded the
possibility of using a principle of this sort to contextually define the concept of number.
And he later took extensions to be governed by an abstraction principle stating that two
concepts have the same extension just in case they are coextensive. As is well-known, the
principle concerning extensions is inconsistent, so any attempt to defend the legitimacy of
using abstraction principles to define mathematical concepts (such as Wright 1983) must
address the question of which abstraction principles are acceptable to this end. But—and
here lies the analogy with the case of (NC)—it will not do simply to say that the acceptable
abstraction principles are the consistent ones. For there are abstraction principles that are
individually consistent but jointly inconsistent (see e.g. Boolos 1990). For more on the
acceptability of abstraction principles, see Fine 2002.
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Maximally Consistent. A set of instances Γ of (NC) is admissible
just in case Γ 6` ⊥ and if Λ is a set of instances of (NC) and
properly extends Γ, then Λ `⊥.11
In fact, this proposal seems to better capture the spirit of Quine’s remark
quoted above, and seems more in keeping with the one step back from dis-
aster rule of thumb, which, if Maddy is right, the early Zermelo subscribed
to. The approach was once advocated by Horwich for truth:
[I]t suffices for us to concede that certain instances of [the T-
Schema (T)] are not to be included as axioms of the minimal
theory, and to note that the principles governing our selection of
excluded instances are, in order of priority: (a) that the minimal
theory not engender ‘liar-type’ contradictions; (b) that the set
of excluded instances be as small as possible; and [. . . ] (c) that
there be a constructive specification of the excluded instances
that is as simple as possible. (Horwich 1990, p. 42)
The view faces a twofold problem, however, as McGee (1992) first pointed
out. First, in the presence of a theory strong enough to interpret Robinson’s
Arithmetic (henceforth Q), maximally consistent sets of instances of (T) are
not recursively axiomatizable, and hence it is unclear whether they can be
said to be theories of truth. Second, there exist several maximally consistent,
and yet incompatible, sets of instances of (T). We are effectively presented
with an embarrassment of riches, and it would seem arbitrary to choose one
over another. We now show that the suggestion that (NC) must be restricted
according to Maximally Consistent faces exactly the same difficulties.
11As usual, we say that a set Λ extends a set Γ iff Γ is a subset of Λ, and that it properly
extends Γ iff Γ is a proper subset of Λ.
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3 Generalizing McGee’s result
We want to show that McGee’s result admits of a natural generalization.
To this end, we first introduce some notation and terminology. If T is a
theory, we write ‘Γ `T φ’ for ‘Γ∪T ` φ’. And we make use of the following
definitions:
Definition 4. Let Γ be a set of sentences and Σ a first-order schema.
(i) Γ is T-consistent iff Γ 6`T⊥.
(ii) Γ is Σ-maximally T-consistent iff Γ is T-consistent and any set which
properly extends Γ and contains Σ-instances not in Γ is T-inconsistent.
(iii) Γ is maximally T-consistent iff it is T-consistent and any set which
properly extends Γ is T-inconsistent.
Clearly, this is an increasing order: if Γ is maximally T-consistent, then it is
Σ-maximally T-consistent; and if Γ is Σ-maximally T-consistent, then it is
T-consistent.
Now let S be a consistent first-order theory entailing the axioms of some
theory S′, let Σ be a first-order schema, and let L be a countable first-order
language. Suppose we relatively interpret in L the language obtained by
adding to the language of S any non-logical expression in Σ. We can then
prove the following:
Theorem 5. Suppose that for each φ ∈ L there is an instance Σφ of Σ such that
`S′ φ↔ Σφ
Then:
(1) For any S-consistent set ∆ of sentences in L, there is a Σ-maximally S-
consistent set Γ of Σ-instances such that Γ `S δ for every δ ∈ ∆.
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(2) If Ξ is a Σ-maximally S-consistent set of Σ-instances, then, for every ψ ∈ L,
Ξ `S′ ψ or Ξ `S′ ¬ψ.
Proof. For (1), let Θ = {Σδ : δ ∈ ∆}. Note that Θ `S δ for every δ ∈ ∆, since
`S δ↔ Σδ
for every δ ∈ ∆. Moreover, since ∆ is S-consistent, so is Θ. Hence, by
Zorn’s Lemma, Θ can be extended to a Σ-maximally S-consistent set Γ of
Σ-instances (see Lemma 8 in Appendix A for details).
For (2), let Ξ be a Σ-maximally S-consistent set of Σ-instances, and take
a ψ ∈ L. Since Ξ is S-consistent, then either Ξ ∪ {ψ} or Ξ ∪ {¬ψ} is S-
consistent.12 So either Ξ ∪ {Σψ} or Ξ ∪ {Σ¬ψ} is S-consistent. But since Ξ
is Σ-maximally S-consistent, either Σψ ∈ Ξ or Σ¬ψ ∈ Ξ. Thus, Ξ `S′ ψ or
Ξ `S′ ¬ψ.
Note that although the first part of the theorem only guarantees the exis-
tence of a certain Σ-maximally S-consistent set Γ of Σ-instances, it follows
from the second part that a corresponding maximally S-consistent set can
be obtained simply by closing Γ under `S.13 Next, note that we could take
S to be a theory which interprets Q. It would then follow from the second
part of the theorem that the theory obtained by adding any Σ-maximally
12For suppose Ξ is S-consistent but neither Ξ ∪ {ψ} nor Ξ ∪ {¬ψ} is S-consistent. From
the fact that Ξ ∪ {ψ} is S-inconsistent it follows that Ξ ∪ {ψ} `S ¬ψ and so, by the
deduction theorem, that Ξ `S ψ→ ¬ψ. But since (ψ→ ¬ψ)→ ¬ψ is a first-order validity
and hence Ξ `S (ψ → ¬ψ) → ¬ψ, we have that Ξ `S ¬ψ. A similar reasoning can be
used to show that Ξ `S ψ follows from the fact that Ξ ∪ {¬ψ} is S-consistent. But then
Ξ `S ¬ψ and Ξ `S ψ, contradicting the initial supposition that Ξ is S-consistent.
13For let Γ be a Σ-maximally S-consistent set of Σ-instances and let DedS(Γ) be the set
of all φs such that Γ `S φ. Clearly, DedS(Γ) is S-consistent. Now suppose there is a set
Λ which properly extends DedS(Γ). Then, there is some φ ∈ L such that φ 6∈ DedS(Γ)
but φ ∈ Λ. Since Γ is a Σ-maximally S-consistent set of Σ-instances, it follows from the
second part of Theorem 5 that for every ψ ∈ L either ψ ∈ DedS(Γ) or ψ 6∈ DedS(Γ). So
¬φ ∈ DedS(Γ). But since Λ is an extension of DedS(Γ), this means that ¬φ ∈ Λ too. Thus,
Λ is S-inconsistent.
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S-consistent set of Σ-instances to S is negation complete, and hence non-
recursively axiomatizable.14 Finally, although we have used Zorn’s Lemma
in the proof of (1), this could be dispensed with by constructing Γ step by
step (see Appendix A for details).
Given the above generalization of McGee’s proof, we can obtain the
desired result in the case that interests us by using Boolos’s observation
mentioned above. (McGee’s result can be recovered as a special case of
Theorem 5, as we show in Appendix B below.) Let R be some consistent
theory entailing the axioms of the theory whose sole non-logical axiom is
(NC∅) ∃y∀x(x ∈ y↔ x 6= x)
And suppose that we have relatively interpreted the language of R in a
countable first-order language L′. We have:
Lemma 6. For each φ ∈ L′,
`NC∅ φ↔ ∃y∀x(x ∈ y↔ (¬φ & x 6∈ x))
Proof. Immediate from Lemma 2.
But together with Theorem 5, Lemma 6 immediately yields:
Corollary 7.
(1) For any R-consistent set ∆ of sentences in L′, there is a (NC)-maximally
R-consistent set Γ of (NC)-instances such that Γ `R δ for every δ ∈ ∆.
(2) If Ξ is a (NC)-maximally R-consistent set of (NC)-instances, then, for every
ψ ∈ L′, Ξ `NC∅ ψ or Ξ `NC∅ ¬ψ.
14That such a theory cannot be recursively axiomatized follows from J. Barkley Rosser’s
(1936) strengthening of Gödel’s (1931) First Incompleteness Theorem, which establishes
that no consistent recursively axiomatizable theory interpreting Q is negation complete.
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4 Maximal consistency is not enough
Corollary 7 has two key philosophical consequences. First, take any theory
which interprets Q and contains a set of instances of (NC) which includes
NC∅ and is (NC)-maximally consistent with the rest of the theory. The sec-
ond part of the Corollary tells us that any such theory is negation complete,
and hence cannot be recursively axiomatized. Clearly, however, any set
theory worth its name should interpret Q. Moreover, NC∅, which simply
asserts the existence of the empty set, should be an acceptable instance of
(NC) if anything is. Thus, there is no reasonably strong recursively axioma-
tizable theory that satisfies the injunction dictated by Maximally Consistent:
to identify our theory of sets with all instances of (NC) that are admissible
according to Maximally Consistent would seem to fall short of providing a
set theory.
Second, even setting this problem aside, the proposed emendation of
naïve set theory is fundamentally flawed. The first part of Corollary 7 gives
us a recipe for constructing several admissible, and yet incompatible, sets
of instances of (NC), each of which has an equal claim to embody the naïve
but consistent conception of set on offer.
To wit, take a σ such that σ and ¬σ are (individually) consistent with
the existence of the empty set. Then, start with the sets {∃y∀x(x ∈ y ↔
(¬σ & x 6∈ x)),NC∅} and {∃y∀x(x ∈ y ↔ (σ & x 6∈ x)),NC∅}, and use
Corollary 7 to extend each of these sets to a (NC)-maximally consistent set
of (NC)-instances. The resulting two (NC)-maximally consistent sets are
incompatible given Lemma 6: taking φ as σ in Lemma 6, we get the result
that the first set implies σ, while taking φ as ¬σ we have the result that
the second set implies ¬σ. In order to restore consistency, the naïve but
consistent set theorist must settle on one such (NC)-maximally consistent
set, as embodying her conception. Yet, we are given no guidance at all as to
how this choice is to be made: consistency was meant to be our sole guide
for restricting (NC).
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To put matters in different terms, the naïve but consistent set theorist
adopts the one step back from disaster rule of thumb, which urges us to
restrict (NC) just enough to avoid inconsistency. However, there are several,
incompatible directions in which such a step back could be taken. Absent
some other rule of thumb, we are at a loss as to what direction should be
favoured. We are inclined to interpret the provision of several mutually
incompatible tamperings of the naïve conception of set as the provision of
no conception at all. If our logic is to remain classical, or classical enough,
yet more tinkering with (NC) is required.15
5 Concluding remarks
The semantic and set-theoretic paradoxes are standardly taken to show
that the naïve conceptions of set and truth are untenable, at least to the
extent that we want to hold on to classical logic. Our results show that
more is in fact true: such conceptions remain untenable even if, following
the likes of Horwich and Quine, we give up precisely the portion of naïveté
that generates paradox. If our logic is to remain classical, a more radical
departure from the naïve schemata is required. This is the strategy pursued,
for instance, by groundedness approaches (Leitgeb 2005) and revision
theories in the case of truth (Gupta and Belnap 1993), and by the iterative
conception (Boolos 1971) and the graph conception (Incurvati 2014) in the
case of sets. Our results do not adjudicate between these approaches, and
leave it open which of them, if any, should be favoured. Still, they do
15Another option would be to both restrict (NC) according to consistency maxims and
substantially weaken classical logic. We do not know whether our results would then
carry over: they hold for classical logical consequence, but they need not continue to
hold for weaker consequence relations. As mentioned above, Goldstein himself endorses
a non-classical logic and hence our results need not undermine his proposal. Here we
simply notice that the suggestion of weakening the logic would be open to the potential
problem that a set theory that is not strong enough to validate the results of this paper
might be too weak. In any event, pending a precise description of the logic Goldstein
favours, the issue remains highly speculative.
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suggest that some approach of this kind is called for. Our final diagnosis
is not different from McGee’s: we take our results to be evidence that
restrictions of the naïve set-theoretic and semantic principles need to be
guided by non-naïve conceptions of sets and truth.16
Appendix A
We first prove the lemma (a version of Lindebaum’s Lemma) used in the
proof of part (1) of Theorem 5:
Lemma 8. Each S-consistent set of Σ-instances can be extended to a Σ-maximally
S-consistent set of Σ-instances.
Proof. Suppose Ξ is a S-consistent set of Σ-instances. Let P be the set of all
S-consistent sets of Σ-instances extending Ξ, partially ordered by inclusion
⊆. If C is a chain of elements in P, then ⋃ C is S-consistent. So ⋃ C is in P,
since
⋃ C contains every S-consistent set of Σ-instances extending Ξ. By
Zorn’s Lemma, P has a maximal element Γ. Now suppose that Γ is not
a maximal element of P. Then, there is some ψ ∈ L such that Γ 6`S Σψ
and Γ 6`S Σ¬ψ. If Γ 6`S Σψ then Σψ 6∈ Γ. And if Γ 6`S Σ¬ψ, then Γ ∪ {Σψ}
is S-consistent and therefore in P. So Γ ∪ {Σψ} is an S-consistent set of Σ-
instances that properly extends Γ, contradicting the fact that Γ is a maximal
element of P. Therefore, Γ is Σ-maximally S-consistent.
We then prove part (1) of Theorem 5 without using Zorn’s Lemma:
16Thanks to David Corfield, Robert van Rooij, Frank Veltman, Zach Weber and Jon
Williamson for valuable discussion and to Tim Button, Laurence Goldstein, Øystein Lin-
nebo and three referees for this journal for extremely helpful comments on earlier versions
of this material. Julien Murzi gratefully acknowledges the Alexander von Humboldt Foun-
dation, the British Academy, and the Leverhulme Trust for generous financial support
during the time this paper was written. This paper is dedicated to the memory of Laurence
Goldstein.
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Proof. Enumerate the sentences of L as ψ0,ψ1,ψ2, . . . and define an increas-
ing sequence Γ0, Γ1, Γ2, . . . of finite sets of Σ-instances as follows:
Γ0 = {Σδ : δ ∈ ∆}
Γn+1 =

Γn ∪ {Σψn} if Γn ∪ {ψn} is S-consistent
Γn ∪ {Σ¬ψn} otherwise
Now let Γ =
⋃
n≥0 Γn. Clearly, Γ `S δ for every δ ∈ ∆. Moreover, Γ0 is
S-consistent if ∆ is, and the sequence Γ0, Γ1, Γ2, . . . is defined so that if Γn
is S-consistent, then Γn+1 is S-consistent too. By induction on n, it follows
that if ∆ is S-consistent, then so is Γn for each n, and hence Γ itself.
To check that Γ is a Σ-maximally S-consistent set of Σ-instances, take ψ ∈
L and suppose Σψ 6∈ Γ. ψ must appear somewhere in the list ψ0,ψ1,ψ2, . . .,
that is ψ = ψm for some m. But if Σψm 6∈ Γ, this must be because Γm ∪ {ψm}
is S-inconsistent. And this means that Γm ∪ {Σψm} is S-inconsistent, since
`S ψm ↔ Σψm
Since Γm ⊆ Γ, Γ ∪ {Σψ} is S-inconsistent too.
Appendix B
For completeness, we show how McGee’s result can be recovered as a
special case of Theorem 5. In this case, we work with a countable first-order
language L? in which we have relatively interpreted the language obtained
by adding Tr to the language of arithmetic. We make use of the following
lemma:
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Lemma 9 (McGee). For each φ in L?, there is a sentence Bφ such that
`Q φ↔ (Tr(pBφq)↔ Bφ)
Proof. Apply Tarski’s Fixed-Point Theorem to the L?-predicate (φ ↔
Tr(x)), and then use the associativity of biconditionals.
Now let A be a consistent arithmetical theory which implies the axioms of
Q. Then, in conjunction with Theorem 5, Lemma 9 immediately delivers
McGee’s result:
Corollary 10 (McGee). For any A-consistent set ∆ of sentences in L?, there is
a (T)-maximally A-consistent set Γ of (T)-instances such that Γ `A δ for every
δ ∈ ∆. Moreover, for all ψ ∈ L?, Γ `Q ψ or Γ `Q ¬ψ.
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